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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an unemployment benefits case. Appellant Ameritel Inns, Inc.

("Ameritel") appeals from a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission
("Commission") that concluded Respondent Megan D. Keller ("Keller") was
eligible for unemployment benefits. Ameritel asks this Court to overturn the
Commission's factual findings that: (a) Keller was discharged by Ameritel; and
(b) Ameritel failed to meet its burden of proving that Keller was discharged for

misconduct in connection employment.

B.

Course of the Proceedings
On or about June 14, 2017, Keller applied for unemployment benefits

with the Idaho Department of Labor ("Department") following her separation
from employment with Ameritel. Exhibit, p.3.
On July 5, 2017, the Department issued a personal eligibility
determination that found Keller was not eligible for unemployment benefits.
Exhibit, pp.16-17.
Keller timely filed an appeal from the eligibility determination on July
19, 2017. Exhibit, pp.22-23.
On August 8, 2017, a telephonic hearing was held on Keller's appeal
before an Appeals Examiner with the Department. R., p.1.
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On August 10, 2017, the Appeals Examiner issued a written decision
which found that Keller was eligible for benefits because Ameritel discharged
her, but not for employment-related misconduct. R., p.6.
Ameritel timely appealed from the decision of the Appeals Examiner to
the Commission by filing a notice of appeal on August 18, 2017. R., pp.9-11.
The Department entered its notice of appearance. R., pp. 16-17.
The Commission conducted a de novo review of the record, R., p.46, and
on October 2, 2017, entered its decision finding Keller was eligible for benefits
because she had been discharged by Ameritel, and Ameritel failed to meet its
burden of proving her discharge was for misconduct in connection with
employment. R., pp.45-55.
On November 7, 2017, Keller timely appealed from the Commission's
decision to the Idaho Supreme Court. R., p.57-59.
C.

Statement of the Facts
Keller began working as a housekeeper at Ameritel on April 9, 2016. Tr.,

p.14, 11.6-14. She later became pregnant and had a due date of mid-September
2017. Tr., p.67, 11.20-22.
Keller was at all times a good worker.

She was never disciplined or

reprimanded by her employer. Tr., p.65, 11.20-24, p.66, 11.1-3. Her supervisor
conceded there were no disciplinary notes in her personnel file. Tr., p.63, 11.4-8.
During the latter months of her pregnancy, Keller was absent from work
due to complications from her pregnancy, namely, that she "was in and out of
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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the hospital a few times and [she was having] a lot of nausea ... and throwing
up all the time." Tr., p.69, 11.4-8. The chemicals at work were contributing to
Keller's complications to the point that she "would have to wear a mask, and
even that [didn't] work, it made [her] even more sick." Tr., p.71, 11.12-19. In
May of 2017, Keller's "illnesses started getting worse." Tr., p.70, 11.3-10.
Keller's supervisor, Cody Black, said he would start looking into
arranging her work to address these difficulties. Tr., p.75, 11.2-4. Keller also
was asked if she wanted to reduce her schedule. Tr., p.75, 11.7-14.
On June 2, 2017, Black called Keller to discuss what could be done for
her:
I called her and asked her what she wanted to do, if she would like
to be taken off the schedule and go on leave, if she wanted less days,
and she agreed that we could figure out some sort of leave
situation, like medical leave the next time she came into work.
Tr., p.43, 11.20-25.
Ameritel's general manager, Gary Horton, testified that on June 2nd,
Keller "called out sick after her shift had started" and texted Black to inform
him of that fact and let him know "that she still wasn't feeling good and that
most likely she might not be in on the 3rd, but wasn't sure." Tr., p.19, 11.13-18.
Horton testified that Keller sent a text message to Black five minutes before her
shift on June 3rd "stating that she would come in and speak with him about a
discussion of possibly some leave or modification of employment, provided she
was continually sick." Tr., p.20, 11.9-13. Horton conceded that Black "may have
been able to take that as her calling in and letting him know that she wasn't
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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going to be available for her work on the 3rd by that statement." Tr., p .20, 11.1416. Black, in his testimony, stated that Keller texted him on June 3rd "saying
she wasn't coming to work." Tr. , p.47, 11.13-14.
Keller did not show up for work June 4, 2017, and, according to Ameritel,
it received no notice from Keller that she would be absent. Tr., p.20, 1.19. Keller
testified that she thought she had sent a text message to Black on June 4th to
inform him that she would be out sick, but that the text message may not have
transmitted due to "user error" or some other reason. Tr. , p.74, 11.2-11.
The next day, June 5, 2017, Keller texted Black that she would be coming
in to "discuss her sick leave" with him. Tr., p.48, 11.12-16. When Black received
this text from Keller, he immediately contacted his general manager, Gary
Horton, for instructions on how to respond her text. Black testified that his
manager "just told me to text her that since she no call, no showed that she
broke policy and that she was done." Tr. , p.48, 11.17-21 (emphasis added). Black
testified further that he then communicated to Keller "that with her no call, no
showing on Sunday that she was no longer employed with us and that I was just
going to take her off the schedule." Tr., p.49, 11.13-15 (emphasis added).
Keller testified that she did not quit her job, but, rather, was discharged
by Ameritel. Tr., p.64, 11.11-17.
As discussed infra, despite the fact that Keller's policies regarding
employee attendance were unclear and loosely applied, particularly as to Keller,
Ameritel chose to treat Keller's "no call, no show" as a job abandonment and
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

4

voluntary quit. Tr., p.20, 1.25 - p.21, 1.2.
This was the first time during Keller's employment with Ameritel that
she was a "no call, no show." Tr., p.67, 1.23 - p.68, 1.5.
After Keller filed for unemployment benefits, Ameritel contested her
eligibility and has continued to assert that Keller quit her job.
Ameritel appeals from the Commission's decision that found Keller
eligible for unemployment benefits. R., p.57-59.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Does substantial competent evidence support the Commission's
findings that Keller was discharged by Ameritel, and that Ameritel
failed to prove it discharged Keller for misconduct in connection
with employment?

II.

Should the Department be awarded its reasonable attorney fees
and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-117(1) and I.A.R. 41?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Substantial Competent Evidence Supports the Commission's
Findings that Keller Was Discharged By Ameritel, and that Ameritel Failed to
Prove Keller Was Discharged for Misconduct in Connection with Employment
A.

Standard of Review
This Court's jurisdiction in appeals from decisions of the Commission is

confined by the Idaho Constitution "to questions oflaw." Idaho Const., Art. V, §
9. Accordingly, the Court is "constitutionally compelled" to uphold Commission
findings of fact supported by substantial competent evidence. Locker v. How
Soel, Inc., 151 Idaho 696, 699, 263 P.3d 750, 753 (2011); Folks v. Moscow School
District No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 836, 933 P.2d 642, 645 (1997). See also, I.C. §
72-732(1) (Commission findings must be upheld unless they "are not based on
any substantial competent evidence").
Substantial competent evidence 1s "such relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Folks, 129
Idaho at 836, 933 P.2d at 645. When applying this standard on appeal, all facts
and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the facts found by the
Commission, and the Commission's determinations as to credibility of witnesses
and weight of evidence must be upheld unless clearly erroneous. Bell v. Idaho
Dept. of Labor, 157 Idaho 744, 746-747, 339 P.3d 1148, 1150-1151 (2014). This
Court will not "re-weigh the evidence or consider whether it would have reached
a different conclusion from the evidence presented." Bell, 157 Idaho at 747, 339
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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P.3d at 1151, quoting Hughen v. Highland Estates. 137 Idaho 349, 351, 48 P.3d
1238, 1240 (2002).

B.

Substantial Competent Evidence Supports the Commission's Finding
That Keller Was Discharged By Ameritel
An unemployment compensation claimant bears the burden of proving

statutory eligibility for benefits. Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415,
417, 614 P.2d 955, 957 (1980).
Idaho Code § 72-1366(5) provides that a claimant is not eligible for
benefits if the claimant "left his employment voluntarily without good cause
connected with his employment" or "was discharged for misconduct in
connection with his employment." Under Section 72-1366(5),
[t]he first step in proving eligibility ... is establishing whether an
employee quit or was discharged. The second step in proving
eligibility depends upon the outcome of the first step. If the
employee quit, the second step is establishing whether it was with
good cause. If the employee was discharged, the second step is
establishing whether it was for misconduct.
Johnson v. Idaho Cent. Credit Union, 127 Idaho 867, 869, 908 P.2d 560, 562
(1995). Once a claimant proves that he or she was discharged, the burden shifts
to the employer to prove the claimant was discharged for misconduct in
connection with employment. Id. Accord, IDAPA 09.01.30.275.01 ("The burden
of proving that a claimant was discharged for employment-related misconduct
rests with the employer.").
An employee is discharged when an "employer's actions or statements
could reasonably be interpreted as discharging the claimant." Hart v. Deary
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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High School, 126 Idaho 550, 552, 887 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1994); accord, Johnson
v. Idaho Central Credit Union, supra (test is whether words or actions of
employer would logically lead prudent person to believe he or she had been
terminated by employer). Viewed from the opposite perspective of a "voluntary
quit," as a general rule there must be an intent on the part of the employee to
leave employment and "absence from the job is not a [voluntary quit] where the
worker intends merely a

temporary interruption in the employment

relationship." Taylor v. Burley Care Center, 121 Idaho 792, 796, 828 P.2d 821,
825 (1991), quoting, Totorica v. Western Equipment Co., 88 Idaho 534, 542, 401
P.2d 817 (1965).

Further, whether an employee quit or was discharged is

question of fact. Johnson v. Idaho Central Credit Union, supra.
In the case at bar, after carefully reviewing the evidence, the Commission
found that Keller did not quit her job but, rather, was discharged by Ameritel:
Although Employer treated Claimant's failure to report to work on
June 4, 2017 without informing her supervisor of her absence as
job abandonment, the evidence in this case establishes that
Employer discharged Claimant. Claimant did not quit.
Decision and Order, p.4 (emphasis added).

Substantial competent evidence

supports this finding.

It is undisputed that Keller was absent from work on June 3, 2017, and
that she informed her immediate supervisor, Cody Black, by text message that
she would not be coming to work that day. Tr., p.47, 11.13-14 (testimony of Cody
Black).
Keller also did not appear for work on June 4, 2017. The Commission
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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found that she had prepared a text message to inform Cody Black of this fact,
"but for whatever reason, the message never transmitted." Decision and Order,
p.3,

,r 9.

This finding is supported by the testimony of Keller:

Q.
. .. Megan, why did you no show, no call on the 4th?
Why did you not come in that day?

A.
I honestly had - - I honestly had written out the text
message and I had thought that I had sent it. So, I don't know if it
was - - I was sick, obviously. That's the only reason why I wouldn't
have came in, but - - yeah. So, I don't know if it was a user error
as in I didn't send it, because I was so sick and I didn't - - I thought
I had and I didn't or if it was a technical fault.
Tr., p.74, 11.2-11.
The fact that Keller neither quit nor intended to quit when she did not
show up for work on June 4, 2017, is supported by her testimony:
Q.

Ma'am, were you discharged or did you quit your job?

A.

Discharged.

Tr., p.64, 11.11-13.
The finding that Keller did not quit is further supported by her conduct
on the day after her June 4th absence from work. It is undisputed that on June
5, 2017, Keller texted her supervisor to inform him that she would be coming in

to "discuss her sick leave" with him, which is what the parties had planned to
do on June 3, 2017. Tr., p.48, 11.12-16. From this fact alone, a reasonable mind
could conclude that Keller had no intention of quitting when she missed work
on June 4th. Keller never informed her employer that she had, or was planning
to, quit her job. To the contrary, the very next day after Keller's so-called job
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abandonment she texted her supervisor to make arrangements to come in and
discuss her sick leave.

If there no longer was an employer-employee

relationship, then any discussion of sick leave would have been a moot point.
What does make sense and what, frankly, is the only reasonable
conclusion to be drawn from the evidence, is that Ameritel terminated Keller.
The Commission's finding that Ameritel did just that follows directly from the
testimony of supervisor Black. When Keller texted Black on June 5th about
coming in to discuss sick leave, Black immediately contacted his general
manager for instructions on how to respond to her text. Black testified that his
general manager "just told me to text her that since she no call, no showed that
she broke policy and that she was done." Tr., p.48, 11.17-21 (emphasis added).
Black testified further that he then communicated to Keller "that with her no
call, no showing on Sunday that she was no longer employed with us and that I
was just going to take her off the schedule." Tr., p.49, 11.13-15 (emphasis added).
Under the facts of this case, a statement such as this, made by a
supervisor to his subordinate, that "you are no longer employed with us," Tr.,
p.49, 11.13-15, is undeniably a statement that "could reasonably be interpreted
as discharging the [employee]." Hart v. Deary High School, 126 Idaho 550, 552,
887 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1994).
Keller testified to her surprise at this abrupt termination:
Q.
. . . Were you surprised when they said you
voluntarily quit due to no call, no show?
A.

Yes.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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Q.

And why were you surprised?

A.
Because I wasn't really expecting that. It was my first
time ever no call, no showing or having portrayed any kind of that
- any kind of behavior at work.
Tr., p.67, 1.23 - p.68, 1.5.
Keller's surprise was understandable for the additional reason that she
and her employer were in the early stages of discussions to try to find an
accommodation or other workplace solution for the complications she was
experiencing due to her pregnancy, and on June 2nd they had agreed to discuss
those issues.
One would have to disbelieve the testimony of both Keller and Black to
conclude that Keller was not discharged. Ameritel's "no call," no show voluntary
quit argument is, at best, a red herring in the truest sense of that expression,
and, at worst, a patent sophism.
Substantial competent evidence supports the Commission finding that
Ameritel discharged Keller.

Under the deferential standard of review

constitutionally compelled in these cases, that finding must be upheld. Locker
v. How Soel, Inc., 151 Idaho at 699, 263 P.3d at 753.
C.

Substantial Competent Evidence Supports the Commission's Finding
That Ameritel Failed to Prove It Discharged Keller For Misconduct In
Connection With Employment
Because Keller was discharged from her employment, the burden of proof

shifted to Ameritel to establish that it discharged her for misconduct in
connection with employment. Johnson v. Idaho Cent. Credit Union, 127 Idaho
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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at 869, 908 P.2d at 562; IDAPA 09.01.30 .. 275.01

Whether an employee's

behavior constitutes misconduct in connection with employment is a question of
fact and reviewed on appeal for substantial competent evidence. Adams v.
Aspen Water, Inc., 150 Idaho 408, 413, 247 P.3d 635, 640 (2011).
"Misconduct" in unemployment benefits cases turns not on whether the
employer had reasonable grounds for discharge, but rather on whether the facts
resulting in the discharge constitute misconduct under Idaho Code § 72-1366(5)
and IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02. See Adams, supra, 150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at
640. The salient flaw of Ameritel's arguments on appeal is its failure to grasp
this important distinction.
The Department's administrative rules describe the proof needed for an
employer to meet its burden of establishing "misconduct" in this setting:

02. Disqualifying Misconduct. Misconduct that disqualifies a
claimant for benefits must be connected with the claimant's
employment and involve one of the following:
a. Disregard of Employer's Interest. A willful, intentional
disregard of the employer's interest.
h. Violation of Reasonable Rules. A deliberate violation of
the employer's reasonable rules.
c. Disregard of Standards of Behavior. If the alleged
misconduct involves a disregard of a standard of behavior
which the employer has a right to expect of his employees,
there is no requirement that the claimant's conduct be
willful, intentional, or deliberate. The claimant's subjective
state of mind is irrelevant. The test for misconduct in
"standard of behavior cases" is as follows:
1.

Whether the claimant's conduct fell below the standard
of behavior expected by the employer; and
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ii. Whether the employer's expectation was objectively
reasonable in the particular case.
IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02. This three-pronged approach follows well-established
Idaho case law. E.g., Johns v. S. H. Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 P.2d
217, 219 (1957); Jenkins v. Agri-Lines Corp., 11 Idaho 549, 602 P.2d 47 (1979);
Folks, supra, 129 Idaho at 836-837, 933 P.2d at 645-646.
The Commission considered all three potential factual bases for
misconduct - violation of employer's reasonable rules, disregard of standards of
behavior, and disregard of employer's interest - and found that Ameritel failed
to demonstrate misconduct under any of them. These factual findings of the
Commission are supported by substantial competent evidence and should be
upheld.
1.
Ameritel failed to prove misconduct based upon a deliberate
violation of its reasonable rules
In evaluating the evidence under the "rules" prong of misconduct, the
Commission correctly looked first to Ameritel's written rules, and observed:
Employer's policy requires employee communication with
supervisors. Employer's policy states that "Whenever an employee
intends to be absent from work (whether for one shift or for a longer
period of time), or is going to be late, he or she must provide notice
to the property manager. Employees are expected to contact their
property manager or other designated point-of-contact as soon as
possible so that a replacement may be brought in for your [sic]
shift." (Exhibit C: p.4.)
Although Employer contends that Claimant's absences were
"excessive," the policy does not define "excessive absences."
Decision and Order, pp.4-5. Ameritel's policy did not describe the means by
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which an employee must use to make contact.

Id., p.5.

The Commission

concluded:
The evidence in the record establishes that Claimant and
Black established a practice of using text messages. Employer's
policy is too vague to put Claimant on notice that her attendance
was unacceptable and put her job in jeopardy. Employer's
witnesses agree that no one specifically told Claimant that her
attendance was violating Employer's policy.
Consequently,
Employer cannot establish that Claimant deliberately violated an
established rule or even the "spirit" of the rule.

Id.
Substantial competent evidence supports these findings.

First, one of

Ameritel's witnesses, general manager Gary Horton, testified that what was
"adequate notice" under employer's attendance policy was "subjective" and that
the policy itself did not specifically state what notice was "adequate." Tr., p.23,
11.4-7. Horton testified that Ameritel did not begin to feel that Keller's absences
were excessive until the end of May 2017, and that because of her work absences
due to illness from that point forward, Ameritel never had a discussion with
Keller to let her know that her absences had become excessive and no longer
would be tolerated:

Q.
. .. [E]xplain to me at what point here did the
employer feel that claimant's attendance was - that her absences
were excessive?
A.
The -we were feeling that it was excessive, but trying
to give her the benefit of the doubt, understanding her condition
and what she was going through.

Q.

At what point?

A.

Let's call it end of- end of May.
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Q.
claimant?

End of May? Was there some sort of discussion with

A.
There had not been a discussion with the claimant,
because she never showed up for work.
Q.

Well, no-

A.
She kept calling in sick by the time we decided what
we wanted to Tr., p. 26, 11.1-15. Ameritel conceded that, if Keller's inconsistent attendance
has gotten out of hand, it "absolutely" was Ameritel's fault for not enforcing its
claimed attendance policy earlier on.

Tr., p.31, 11.13-16 (testimony of Gary

Horton).
The Commission's finding regarding the absence of a specific company
rule or policy governing the manner in which an employee should communicate
an absence finds direct support, again, from Ameritel's own witness. Kristi
Bachman, Ameritel's human resources manager, testified:
Our company does not say in [its policy] that you cannot text, it
just asks to provide sufficient notice. Each property sets their own
policies as to whether or not they well accept text messages as
notice.
Tr., p.61, 11.6-9.
Last, and most important, to establish misconduct under the rules prong,
an employer must prove that the violation of the employer's reasonable rules
was "deliberate." IDAPA 09.0l.30.275.02(b). Ameritel argues on appeal that
the rules violation of significance in this case is the failure of Keller to timely
communicate her June 4th absence to her supervisor. However, the unrebutted
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testimony of Keller, quoted supra at pp.9-10 of this brief, is that she attempted
to send a text message to Black on June 4th to inform him that she would be out
sick, but that for some unknown reason it did not transmit. See Tr., p.74, 11.211.

This testimony supports a finding that Keller's apparent failure to

communicate her June 4th absence to Black was not deliberate; she tried to do
so but, unbeknownst to her, the communication failed.
The finding that Ameritel failed to establish misconduct with proof of a
deliberate violation of its reasonable rules is supported by substantial
competent evidence and must be upheld.
2.
Ameritel failed to prove misconduct based upon a disregard of a
standard of employee behavior that it had a right to expect of its employees
The "standards of behavior" basis for establishing misconduct is set forth
in the Department's administrative rules:
c. Disregard of Standards of Behavior. If the alleged
misconduct involves a disregard of a standard of behavior
which the employer has a right to expect of his employees,
there is no requirement that the claimant's conduct be
willful, intentional, or deliberate. The claimant's subjective
state of mind is irrelevant. The test for misconduct in
"standard of behavior cases" is as follows:
1.

Whether the claimant's conduct fell below the standard
of behavior expected by the employer; and

ii. Whether the employer's expectation was objectively
reasonable in the particular case.
IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02(c). This Court explained in Adams v. Aspen Water, Inc.,
150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at 640, that "[t]he first prong of the [standards of
behavior] test addresses only what the employer subjectively expected from the
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employee." Under the second prong of this test, to be "objectively reasonable,"
an employer's expectation . . . must be communicated to the
employee, unless the expectation is the type that flows naturally
from the employment relationship. An expectation flows naturally
from the employment relationship when the expectations are
common among employees in general or within a particular
enterprise.
Such expectations are generally limited to
fundamental expectations and do not involve specific rules unless
clearly embodied in the job at issue.
Adams, 150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at 640 (citations omitted).
Here, Ameritel's ambiguous policy concerning what is "adequate notice"
of an employee's absence from work, see supra, brief at pp.14-16, supports a
finding that Ameritel's expectations were not communicated to Keller. Further,
because of Ameritel's course of conduct with Keller, particularly the "leniency"
that Black afforded her regarding attendance, "in this particular enterprise" the
strict attendance expectation now being asserted on appeal by Ameritel did not
"naturally flow" from the employment relationship that existed between
Ameritel and Keller. In a more typical employment context, this expectation
might be expected to "naturally flow" from the employment relationship, but the
relationship here was not typical.
Manager Gary Horton testified that Keller's attendance was "very spotty
and unreliable." Tr., p.16, 1.8. He explained that
[l]ots of times [Keller called in] even after her shift had started,
five , ten minutes following the start of her shift, maybe even
shortly prior to her shift letting us know that she wouldn't be able
to come in, that she was feeling sick over again. A couple of times
when we would notify her that she would need to bring a doctor's
note and she would call u s the next day saying she was going to be
a little bit late, because she still had to run by a clinic to pick up a
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doctor's note to excuse her previous absence ....
Tr., p.16, 11.8-17.
The attendance expectation that flowed from the particular relationship
between Ameritel and Keller was, in a word, lenient. Horton testified:
A.
. . . I believe we were trying to - we were making an
attempt to be as accommodating as possible.

Q.
What would you do to - what would occur to any other
employee that no called or no showed to a shift -- a scheduled shift?
A.
You know, typically we would - it depends on - on the
individual and the history the individual had with us. If - if they
had just been hired and they didn't call in for a shift, we would just
assume that they didn't want their employ and - and terminate and consider them a no show, no call, and a voluntary quit. There
are times that - like we did with Ms. Keller, reach out to her and
try to contact them following the shift, giving them the benefit of
the doubt that maybe they had not seen the schedule properly or
not been on there and maybe reached out to them.
Tr., p.18, 11.8-24.

Ameritel never suggested to Keller that her absences from

work had become unacceptable:
EXAMINER LITTLE:
... And what I'm hearing from
testimony is that the employer and claimant both discussed some
sort of accommodations for her at work. However, at no time did
the employer indicate to the claimant that her absences - her
absences from work was [sic] unacceptable. Is that correct, Mr.
Horton?
MR. HORTON: I suppose so, Your Honor.
Tr., p.83, 1.21 - p.84, 1.2.

It bears emphasis that, under the teachings of this Court, "[a]n
expectation flows naturally from the employment relationship when the
expectations are common among employees in general or within a particular
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enterprise." Adams, 150 Idaho at 413, 247 P .3d at 640 (emphasis added). At
Ameritel - which is the "particular enterprise" involved here - its claimed
expectation that no failures to appear for a scheduled shift would be tolerated,
is not an expectation that flowed naturally from the relationship that existed
between Keller and Ameritel. The parties' course of conduct demonstrates that
the expectation was much less rigorous.
Substantial competent evidence supports the Commission's finding that
Ameritel failed to demonstrate misconduct under the "standards of behavior"
test.
3.
Ameritel failed to prove misconduct based upon a willful,
intentional disregard of its interest
As

noted

above,

an

employer

can

prove

misconduct

by

demonstrating a claimant willfully and intentionally disregarded an
employer's interest. IDAPA 09.0l.30.275.02(a). The Commission found that
Ameritel also failed to prove misconduct under this standard:
In this case, Claimant maintains that she did the best that she
could to keep in touch with her supervisor. She cannot explain why
the text message she drafted on June 4, 2017 was never sent, but
the failure was not intentional. (Audio Recording.) There is no
evidence that Claimant's failures to meet Employer's standards
were the result of some willful or intentional behavior. Therefore,
it is concluded that Claimant acted without a "willful, intentional
disregard" of Employer's interest.
Decision and Order, p.9.
The evidence discussed above under the "employer's rules" and
"standards of behavior" prongs of misconduct supports this finding and need not
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be reiterated here, except to say that Keller attempted to send a text message
to Black that she would be out sick on June 4th but that for some unknown
reason it did not transmit. See Tr., p.74, 11.2-11.

Keller's apparent failure to

communicate her June 4th absence to Black was neither deliberate nor willful
and intentional.
Substantial competent evidence supports the Commission's finding that
Ameritel failed to prove that Keller willfully and intentionally disregarded its
interest. The finding must be upheld.
II.
Attorney Fees and Costs Should Be Awarded to the Department Under
LC.§ 12-117(1) and I.A.R. 41 Because Ameritel's Appeal Has No Reasonable
Basis in Law or Fact
Idaho Code § 12-117 (1) provides as follows:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving
as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a
person, the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing
the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing
party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable
expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.
The 2012 amendments to Idaho Code § 12-117(1) make clear that, if certain
findings are made, attorney fees shall be awarded in appeals from decisions of
the Commission. See 2012 Idaho Sess. Laws ch.149, p.419 (amending language
of LC.§ 12-117 to enlarge its scope to include "any proceeding" and to direct an
award of attorney fees to the prevailing party by the court "hearing the
proceeding, including on appeal").
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Section 12-117(1) provides that the court "shall award the prevailing
party reasonable attorney's fees ... if it finds that the non prevailing party acted
without a reasonable basis in law or fact." (Emphasis added.) See also Rule Steel
Tanks, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Labor, 115 Idaho 812, 819, 317 P.2d 709, 716 (2013)
(awarding attorney fees to Department in employer's appeal regarding transfer
of experience rating account).
As in Locker, supra, in this appeal, Ameritel simply asks this Court to
engage in its own fact finding, and to reach a conclusion different from that of
the Commission. This the Court cannot do. E.g., Idaho Const. Art. V, § 9.
Ameritel has presented on appeal no legal issues of any significance. This is
simply an appeal where Ameritel disagrees with the Commission's factual
findings. Because this appeal was brought frivolously, and without a reasonable
foundation in both law and fact, it is respectfully requested that the Department
be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-117(1)
and I.A.R. 41.
CONCLUSION

It is for the Commission to determine the credibility and weight to be
accorded testimony; its findings will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.
Locker, supra, 151 Idaho at 699, 263 P.3d at 753.

Substantial competent

evidence supports the Commission's findings that Ameritel discharged Keller,
and that Ameritel failed to prove that she was discharged for misconduct in
connection with employment. The Commission's decision must be affirmed.
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Further, pursuant to I.C. § 12-117(1) and I.A.R. 41, because Ameritel's
appeal has been brought without a reasonable foundation in fact or law, the
Department as the prevailing party shall be awarded its reasonable attorney
fees and costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

~

DOUG WERTH
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Labor
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